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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Tyson Baker appeals his convictions for stealing public 
property and for related offenses.  He complains of the District 
Court’s denial of his request for a jury instruction on 
entrapment, the jury instruction that was given on intent, and 
3 
 
the exclusion of his wife’s testimony regarding her medical 
expenses.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual History1  
 
Baker was employed as a police officer by the Fairview 
Township Police Department in York County, Pennsylvania.  
In 2015, the FBI approached Baker’s fellow officer Michael 
Bennage to assist in an investigation into allegations that Baker 
was involved in the theft of drug proceeds.  Bennage 
reluctantly agreed to “keep [his] ear to the ground” and “report 
back to them what [he] saw or heard.”  (App. at 45.)  
 
He did so.  A few months later, he relayed to the FBI 
that Baker had suggested to him that “we … start ripping off 
drug dealers as a means to help financially with our individual 
bills and stresses of life.”  (App. at 48.)  An FBI agent then 
gave Bennage a recording device to capture any future 
incriminating conversations.  In September 2015, Bennage 
recorded a conversation with Baker during which, in response 
to Bennage’s statement that he had heard of a drug dealer who 
would be transporting a large sum of money, Baker said it 
sounded “like a rip to me, a straight up rip.”  (App. at 52.)  
 
                                                 
1  “Because the jury returned a verdict in favor of [the 
government], we must examine the record in a light most 
favorable to [the government], giving [it] the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences… .”  Mancini v. Northampton Cty., 836 
F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). 
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A few weeks passed without incident.  Then, on 
November 17th, Baker apparently learned from a police report 
prepared by Bennage that Bennage had found cash on a drug-
overdose victim, and Baker indicated he wanted some of the 
money.  He texted, “Where’s mine?  LOL.”  (App. at 57.)  
Bennage responded that other officers had been watching him, 
to which Baker texted, “next time.  LOL.”  (App. at 58.)  
 
Three days afterwards, on November 20, Bennage 
secured a search warrant for a residence suspected to be used 
in illegal drug transactions.  In the process of executing that 
warrant, Bennage and other officers discovered multiple stacks 
of cash amounting to $1,000 each.  Baker arrived at the scene 
hours later, after sending an unexpected text to Bennage saying 
that he would help with the evidence.  Baker told Bennage, 
“tonight’s the night, don’t get greedy, be smart.”  (App. at 70.)  
Later that day, after the drug proceeds had been moved to the 
conference room, Baker told Bennage the stacks should be 
“less two[]” for the two of them to split.  (App. at 82, 472.)  
Baker ultimately told Bennage to put his share, a single stack, 
in a toolbox in Baker’s truck.2   
 
Less than a month later, on December 16th, the FBI and 
Bennage executed an undercover operation in which Bennage 
and Baker would stop an FBI agent travelling with $15,000 and 
posing as a drug trafficker.  The operation went according to 
plan: Bennage pulled over the undercover officer, and Baker 
arrived at the scene shortly thereafter.  Bennage then took the 
‘trafficker’ in for booking, leaving Baker alone with the 
                                                 
2  Baker, however, had driven a different car to work, so, 
instead, Baker unlocked his car and Bennage hid the money 
under the driver’s side mat.   
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vehicle.  Once alone, Baker had the car towed to a garage and 
searched it.  He discovered a bag containing the $15,000.  
Unbeknownst to Baker, the FBI had installed cameras in the 
vehicle and remotely watched the entire process.    Baker took 
$3,000.3  Baker later described that theft as the result of his 
“ugly thoughts[.]”  (App. at 478.)   
 
He was taken into custody by the FBI two days later, 
and he confessed to the thefts that took place on 
November 20th and December 16th.   
 
B. Procedural History  
 
A grand jury returned an eight count indictment against 
Baker, including a charge for stealing or embezzling public 
money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.  Baker subsequently 
entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he pled guilty 
to violating § 641.  He was later permitted to withdraw that 
plea, and he eventually proceeded to trial.    
 
At trial, Baker made three requests that are at issue on 
this appeal.  First, he asked the District Court to give a jury 
instruction on the defense of entrapment, but he and the 
government agreed to wait until “the conclusion of testimony” 
for the Court to “make [its] decision whether … [he had] fairly 
raised [the defense].”  (App. at 446.)  After the close of 
testimony, the District Court decided that an entrapment 
instruction was not warranted and did not give the requested 
instruction.   
 
                                                 
3  Baker gave Bennage $1,000 and kept $2,000 for 
himself.   
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Second, Baker requested a jury instruction requiring the 
government to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 with 
evidence that he had an intent to permanently deprive the 
government of its money, and stating that a temporary 
deprivation was insufficient.  The District Court disagreed and 
instructed the jury that “[t]o steal or knowingly convert [within 
the meaning of § 641] means … [to do so] with intent to 
deprive the owner of its use or benefit either temporarily or 
permanently.”  (App. at 557.)   
 
Third, Baker wanted to present testimony by his wife 
about the financial burden created by her cancer-related 
medical bills.  Baker gave two reasons for offering that 
evidence: first, to demonstrate that he did not intend to 
permanently deprive the government of its money, and, 
second, to respond to the government’s evidence showing his 
nice home.4  The District Court concluded that the first purpose 
was irrelevant.  As to the second purpose, the Court excluded 
the proposed testimony, saying there was a risk of unfair 
prejudice to the government due to sympathy for a cancer 
survivor.  The District Court did, however, rule that Baker and 
his wife could explain the fine quality of the house, by saying, 
for example, that Mrs. Baker’s parents helped pay for it.5  And, 
the Court allowed Baker himself to testify about the burdens 
                                                 
4  The government presented photographic evidence of 
Bakers’ home, which Baker argued would cause the jury to 
think that, since he has “this big nice house with a pole barn, 
tractors, and all that stuff, therefore he must be stealing 
money.”  (App. at 442.)  
 
5  Baker did not call Mrs. Baker to testify at trial.   
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associated with his wife’s medical bills, though it did not allow 
Mrs. Baker to discuss them.   
 
The jury found Baker guilty of violating § 641 by 
stealing or embezzling public funds, and also convicted him of 
related offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1519, and 
2232.6  The District Court sentenced him to forty-two months’ 
imprisonment, to be followed by two years of supervised 
release.  Baker timely appealed.  
 
II. DISCUSSION7 
 
Baker argues on appeal that the District Court erred by 
(1) refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment, (2) refusing to 
instruct the jury that an intent to permanently deprive, as 
opposed to temporarily deprive, the government of property is 
                                                 
6  Baker was found guilty of false statements, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, falsification of records in a federal 
investigation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1519, and two counts of 
destruction or removal of property to prevent seizure, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 2232.   
 
7  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We exercise plenary review 
over a denial of a request for an entrapment instruction, United 
States v. Dennis, 826 F.3d 683, 690 (3d Cir. 2016), and in 
assessing whether a jury instruction stated the proper legal 
standard, United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 
1995).  We review the District Court’s decision regarding the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States 
v. Knight, 700 F.3d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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necessary to establish theft under § 641, and (3) excluding 
Mrs. Baker’s testimony about her medical expenses.  We 
disagree with his contentions on all points.  
 
A. The District Court did not err in refusing to 
instruct the jury on entrapment. 
 Baker argues that the District Court erred in denying his 
“request for an entrapment instruction despite there being 
evidence to support one.”  (Opening Br. at 13.)  An entrapment 
instruction is warranted when there is “inducement by the 
government to commit the crime,” and “the defendant[] lack[s] 
[the] predisposition to commit the crime.”  United States v. 
Dennis, 826 F.3d 683, 690 (3d Cir. 2016).  “Under our 
jurisprudence, to make an entrapment defense a defendant 
must come forward with some evidence as to both inducement 
and non-predisposition.”  United States v. El-Gawli, 837 F.2d 
142, 145 (3d Cir. 1988).  At the least, Baker failed to carry his 
burden with respect to inducement, and thus an entrapment 
instruction was not warranted.    
 
Inducement is not “mere solicitation” or “merely 
opening an opportunity for a crime[.]”  Dennis, 826 F.3d at 
690.  Rather, “the defendant must show that law enforcement 
engaged in conduct that takes the form of persuasion, 
fraudulent representation, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, 
promises of reward or pleas based on need, sympathy or 
friendship.”  Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).   
 
There is, however, no evidence that the government did 
anything of the sort here.  At the outset, the FBI did not instruct 
Bennage to set up a crime or organize a sting operation.  
Bennage was simply asked to “keep [his] ear to the ground” 
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regarding Baker.8  (App. at 45.)  The first theft, on 
November 20, 2015, confirms that Baker, not Bennage, was 
the orchestrator.  Baker unexpectedly inserted himself into the 
processing of a crime scene, texting and offering to help with 
the evidence.  Baker’s own testimony made clear that Bennage 
did not influence or otherwise motivate the decision to steal on 
that occasion.  Instead, Baker’s motivation was: 
 
Being tired, not sleepy tired.  Tired.  Tired, tired 
mentally.  Tired – I don’t remember what movie, 
but it was the Rocky movie that said, “Did you 
ever get punched in the face a thousand times?  It 
starts to sting after a while.” Well, I was getting 
punched in the face, and I was tired.  
(App. at 473.)   
 
Baker’s second theft, on December 16, 2015, likewise 
does not present evidence of inducement.  While that theft was 
based on an FBI undercover operation, according to Baker’s 
own testimony, his motivation was internal, stemming from 
“ugly” thoughts and being “tired” and “weak.”  (App. at 478.)  
                                                 
8  Moreover, according to Bennage, the FBI only 
provided Bennage with a recording device after Baker had 
expressed interest in “ripping off drug dealers.”  (App. at 48.)  
Baker offered a conflicting account at trial, claiming that his 
recorded exchange with Bennage in September 2015 was the 
first time they had discussed the idea to steal from drug dealers, 
and that the suggestion to do so originated with Bennage.  But 
even if we disregarded the evidence indicating otherwise, 
Baker’s testimony reveals no action taken by Bennage that 
went beyond “mere solicitation[.]”  Dennis, 826 F.3d at 690. 
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Baker testified, moreover, that Bennage did not harass or 
persuade him to steal:  
 
Q: Officer Bennage wasn’t there with you 
saying, take that money, take that money, 
was he?  
A: No, sir.  
Q: That was your personal decision, correct?  
A: Yes, sir.   
(App. at 495.)  Baker’s actions, according to his testimony, 
were the result of his own decision-making, and that decision-
making was, by his own admission, motivated by his mental 
state, not inducement by the government.  Cf. United States v. 
Fedroff, 874 F.2d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Entrapment is a 
relatively limited defense that may defeat a prosecution only 
when the Government’s deception actually implants the 
criminal design in the mind of the defendant.” (citations and 
quotations omitted)).    
 
Baker thus failed to meet his burden of production with 
respect to entrapment, and the District Court properly refused 
his request for an entrapment instruction. 
 
B. The District Court did not err in its 
instruction to the jury regarding specific 
intent. 
Baker argues that the District Court erred in refusing to 
include a jury instruction that an “inten[t] to permanently 
deprive another of their property [is necessary to demonstrate 
a theft] and that [a] temporary deprivation [is] not 
sufficient… .”  (Opening Br. at 20.)  That argument fails 
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because intent to permanently deprive is not an element of the 
offense, and its absence is not a defense.  
 
Section 641 of Title 18 of the United States Code 
prohibits the stealing of public money.9  “The Supreme Court 
has made clear that … § 641 was designed to apply to not only 
larceny and embezzlement but all instances … under which 
one may obtain wrongful advantages from another’s property.”  
United States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Morissette 
v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 266 n.28, 266-67 (1952) 
(describing the scope of § 641, and noting “that it was to apply 
to acts which constituted larceny or embezzlement at common 
law and also acts which shade into those crimes but which, 
most strictly considered, might not be found to fit their fixed 
definitions”).  Accordingly, courts have followed that guidance 
and concluded that intent to temporarily or permanently 
deprive the government of its money satisfies the intent 
element of § 641.  See United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 
                                                 
9  18 U.S.C. § 641 provides, in relevant part: “Whoever 
embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or 
the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or 
disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of 
the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or 
any property made or being made under contract for the United 
States or any department or agency thereof; or Whoever 
receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it 
to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, 
purloined or converted… [s]hall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than ten years[.]” 
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500-01 (5th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases from the Fifth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).10    
 
We have addressed the same issue with respect to a 
similar statute, 18 U.S.C. § 661, and determined that “intent to 
steal” does not require an intent that there be a permanent 
deprivation.11  United States v. Henry, 447 F.2d 283, 284-86 
                                                 
10  To support his argument, Baker cites two cases.  Both 
are inapposite.  The first merely re-states the statutory language 
of 18 U.S.C. § 641.  United States v. Dupee, 569 F.2d 1061, 
1062 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978).  Moreover, that case rejected an 
argument similar to the one Baker now makes, that failing to 
return government funds amounts to a temporary deprivation 
or a “debtor-creditor relationship[,]” as opposed to 
embezzlement.  Id. at 1064.  The second case does not support 
Baker’s proposed characterization of intent either.  On the 
contrary, the court said, “[w]hen one wrongfully and 
intentionally embezzles or misappropriates the property of 
another … the offense is complete.  The mere fact [that the 
defendant] intends subsequently to return the property or to 
make restitution to the rightful owner does not relieve his 
wrongful act … .  Hence, the mere fact that [a] defendant at a 
subsequent date made restitution of the amount of the shortage 
does not wipe out the offense.”  United States v. Powell, 294 
F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff’d, 413 F.2d 1037 (4th 
Cir. 1969). 
 
11  18 U.S.C. § 661 provides, in relevant part: “Whoever, 
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, takes and carries away, with intent to steal or 
purloin, any personal property of another shall be 
punished… .”  That statute criminalizes the taking and carrying 
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(3d Cir. 1971).  Following the Supreme Court’s lead, we said 
that in “various federal statutes the word ‘stolen’ or ‘steal’ has 
been given a meaning broader than larceny at common law.”  
Id. at 285 (citation omitted); accord Morissette, 342 U.S. at 
266 n.28, 266-67.  We thus rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the statute required “the intent to permanently deprive an 
owner of his property” and held that a jury instruction requiring 
simply “intent to deprive the owner of the benefit of 
ownership” was appropriate.  Henry, 447 F.2d at 284, 286.   
 
In short, “[a]n intent to return the property does not 
exculpate the defendant.”  United States v. Faulkner, 638 F.2d 
129, 130 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 659); see also 
Henry, 447 F.3d at 286.  The crime is complete when the theft 
or embezzlement of funds occurs.  See United States v. 
Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 858 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 871 (1979) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 656, and stating that 
“it is sufficient that the defendant at least temporarily 
deprive[d] the [government] of the possession, control or use 
of its funds” and that “[s]ubsequent restitution … is not a 
defense since the crime [of embezzlement or theft] is complete 
when the misapplication occurs”).   
 
Whether Baker told himself he was just borrowing the 
government’s money is not relevant to his guilt.  The jury was 
appropriately instructed with respect to § 641.   
                                                 
away of personal property with the “intent to steal or purloin.”  
Id.   
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C. The District Court did not err in refusing to 
allow Mrs. Baker’s testimony regarding her 
breast cancer and medical expenses. 
Finally, Baker argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion by excluding the testimony of his wife regarding her 
prior medical expenses.  Baker sought to use that evidence for 
two purposes.  First, he said “it was evidence of [his] lack of 
intent to permanently deprive the government of its property.”  
(Opening Br. at 15.)  Second, he thought it would rebut “the 
false impression that he had stolen money to improve his 
property[,]” an impression he feared was created by the 
government’s introduction of pictures of his house.12  (Opening 
Br. at 16.)  But the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding that evidence.  
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that “[e]vidence 
is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the 
fact is of consequence in determining the action.”  Thus, with 
respect to Baker’s first stated purpose, because intent to 
permanently deprive is not an element of the offense and an 
intent to return is not a defense, evidence offered to prove those 
points would be irrelevant.  And, even if Mrs. Baker’s 
testimony regarding her medical expenses were relevant, the 
                                                 
12  To the extent that Baker argues that Mrs. Baker’s 
testimony about her medical expenses would have “supported 
his defense” of entrapment, we are similarly unpersuaded.  
(Opening Br. at 16.)  Baker was not entitled to a jury instruction 
of entrapment (even if that evidence had been offered to that 
effect), so Mrs. Baker’s testimony for that purpose would have 
been irrelevant and was rightly excluded.  
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District Court was within its discretion in deciding that the 
probative value of such testimony was substantially 
outweighed by danger that the testimony regarding her cancer 
and medical expenses could mislead the jury due to 
“sympathy” for her status as a cancer survivor.  Fed. R. Evid. 
403.  (App. at 443.)     
 
 Nor did the District Court err in excluding that 
testimony despite the second proffered purpose, i.e., to rebut 
the “insinuati[on] or … impression that [Baker] has this giant 
house and all these luxury items in the house, [and that] 
therefore he must be stealing.”  (App. at 443.)  Baker is correct 
that his second purpose might be relevant to explaining or 
otherwise providing context behind the improvements to his 
home.  Again, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
provides that a court “may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  In a Rule 403 
analysis, we may take into account “the availability of other 
means of proof” when considering whether such evidence 
should be excluded.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 
184-85 (1997).   
 
Here, less prejudicial evidence was available to support 
the same purpose.  The District Court made clear that Mrs. 
Baker could testify to “how they obtained the house, the whole 
history with her mother and father … and how they got things 
up until the relevant time here when those pictures were taken.”  
(App. at 444.)  Moreover, it also provided that Baker himself 
could testify about his wife’s parents, their history with the 
house, and his wife’s medical expenses.  Given that Baker and 
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his wife were permitted to testify about their financial 
difficulties, and Baker was able to testify about the medical 
expense burden, the District Court provided him ample 
opportunity to rebut whatever impression the Government’s 
evidence may have given about Baker’s spending.  The District 
Court was within its discretion in deciding that any particular 
benefit of Mrs. Baker’s testimony about her cancer-related 
medical expenses was substantially outweighed by the risk of 
understandable but irrelevant sympathy.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction. 
 
